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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines conditions in which alliance networks (informal webs of bilateral entanglements between 
firms) may or may not evolve into multilateral alliances (broad, formal multiple-firm arrangements). I offer a 
theory to explain the formation of multilateral alliances based on both the resource profile and the structure of 
existing interfirm networks, and provide an initial test of that theory in the context of the global airline industry. 
Using data from 75 global airlines and their alliances, I propose a methodology to retrieve samples of alliance 
networks and then use regression analysis to assess how the resource profile and the structure of these networks 
influence their formalization into multilateral alliances. I find that multilateral alliances are more likely to 
emerge when alliance networks exhibit high resource diversity and network structure characterized by moderate 
density and high centralization. Apparently, while highly sparse networks reduce actors’ awareness of their 
potential joint collaboration, highly dense or embedded networks substitute for the need for formal controls 
accompanying multilateral agreements. The effect of centralization suggests that the formation of multilateral 
alliances tends to be triggered by leading actors directly connected to other network members. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A recent trend altering patterns of interfirm interaction has been the formation of alliances among 
multiple autonomous firms, which collaborate among themselves and compete against other groups of 
firms for both clients and members (Gomes-Casseres, 1994, 1996). Evidence of the formation of such 
groups pervades the literature, including industries as diverse as computer and microprocessors 
(Vanhaverbeke & Noorderhaven, 2001), telecommunications (Joshi, Kashlak, & Sherman, 1998), 
financial services (Domowitz, 1995), automobiles (Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991) and global airlines, 
which are the focus of this study (Hanlon, 1999; Lazzarini, 2007; Lazzarini & Joaquim, 2004). 
Linkages between international airline carriers, for instance, imply that travelers will have several 
substitute routes to reach a particular destination, serviced by groups of firms exploiting 
complementary legs. The emergence of associations between multiple firms has led some scholars to 
propose that the locus of competition has shifted from firms to groups of firms that collaborate with 
one another (Gomes-Casseres, 1996). 
One way of analytically demarcating the membership of a firm in those alternative groups is to 
observe the structure of bilateral or dyadic associations between firms, such as pair-wise agreements or 
equity stakes (Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991; Vanhaverbeke & Noorderhaven, 2001). In this sense, 
Gomes-Casseres (1996) defines an alliance network  as a group of “separate companies linked 
through collaborative agreements,” though “not all the companies in a group have to be linked directly 
to all the others” (p. 65). For instance, an airline carrier may develop an agreement to offer joint 
connections with two other international carriers, which may or may not have a direct agreement with 
each other. Moreover, a firm in a technology-intensive industry may develop an R&D project with 
another firm, which may in turn create a marketing agreement with a third party, and so forth. Using 
Das and Teng’s (2002) characterization, alliance networks are simply a “collection of several 
alliances” among players in a certain industry (p. 446). Multiple-firm collaboration in an alliance 
network is therefore implicit because there are no formal terms guiding the joint action of firms, even 
though pair-wise ties may be, to some extent, formalized.  
In some circumstances, however, a restricted group of firms decides to formalize their mutual 
association in a multilateral alliance composed of overarching agreements applicable to all members 
of the group (Doz & Hamel, 1998). Instead of a collection of several alliances between firms, a 
multilateral alliance is a broad multiple-firm alliance. Multilateral alliances often involve formal 
entities to manage the affairs of the group (such as decision-making committees) and even common 
investment in brand names and technology platforms. In the airline industry, multilateral alliances are 
exemplified by global groupings such as the Star Alliance, Oneworld and SkyTeam, in which carriers 
develop broad agreements to share traffic, pursue joint operations, and develop common marketing 
programs, thus going beyond webs of agreements negotiated on a largely bilateral basis.   
Therefore, this paper attempts to answer the following research question: Why do firms involved in 
an alliance network decide to formalize their association in a multilateral alliance? In other 
words, what determines the chosen governance structure of the network as a whole? Even though 
there is a great deal of studies analyzing governance choices in dyadic alliances (e.g. Gulati, 1995; 
Pisano, 1989), research into the organization of interfirm networks has been scant. For the most part, 
the literature has downplayed the role of formal controls and contracts in alliance networks, arguing 
that extensive interfirm linkages allow for informal mechanisms of governance that promote 
cooperation (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996). Studies analyzing processes of network formalization, 
on the other hand, have generally treated the formation of multilateral alliances as an evolutionary 
process in which joint action is institutionalized over time (e.g. Doz, Olk, & Ring, 2000). 
Consequently, most research into networks has not described conditions in which multilateral 
agreements will emerge because scholars have rarely pointed out factors that may or may not trigger 
the formalization of networks.  
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I fill this void by offering hypotheses that are initially tested using data from 75 global airlines and 
their alliances. The airline industry has seen a surge in alliances between carriers, in part because 
regulatory barriers prevent access to global resources and markets through the outright acquisition of 
domestic airport facilities or carriers (Hanlon, 1999). Thus, alliances have become a crucial 
mechanism for carriers to internalize interfirm externalities in the form of international traffic flows. 
Initially, carriers sought to create bilateral associations involving either equity stakes or pair-wise 
alliances such as codesharing (whereby two carriers combine routes as a single composite product to 
customers) and marketing agreements (joint frequent flyer programs and combined promotion efforts). 
Observing patterns of bilateral partnering in the industry, analysts have long noted the existence of 
alliance networks corresponding to groups of bilaterally tied firms servicing a web of routes and 
competing with carriers offering alternative connections (Whitaker, 1996).  
In the mid 1990s, however, carriers began to create formalized groups competing for traffic (Star 
Alliance, Oneworld, SkyTeam etc.). These groups correspond to multilateral alliances because 
agreements are applicable to all partners and are broad in nature. For instance, they involve full 
marketing cooperation with respect to frequent flyer programs and promotion (including investments 
in a common brand name), in addition to joint access to airport facilities controlled by individual 
members. They also offer comprehensive codesharing agreements comprising several routes instead of 
bilateral agreements comprising few routes. Estimates indicate that these multilateral alliances 
contributed to almost 60% of global air traffic in 2001, representing 203.3 billion dollars in revenues 
(Baker, 2001). Therefore, although focusing on the airline industry may prevent the generalization of 
empirical results to other contexts, it nonetheless provides a rich setting for an empirical examination 
of how alliance networks may or may not evolve into multilateral alliances. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I develop testable hypotheses grounding the 
theory discussion in the context of the airline industry to facilitate understanding and to provide a 
more direct link to the empirical analysis. I next describe the methods employed to test the hypotheses, 
and then discuss the results. Concluding remarks follow.  
 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
 
My theory employs the network as the unit of analysis (Dyer & Singh, 1998). In particular, I build 
upon the recent body of knowledge analyzing multiple-firm alliances. Scholars have described the 
emergence of such groups and discussed the motivation for firms to engage in multiple-firm networks 
(Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Lorenzoni & Ornati, 1988). In a given industry, 
one can typically observe several multiple-firm alliances competing against each other for both clients 
and members. Initially, empirical studies attempted to observe such networks in different industries 
and demarcate the boundaries of groups (e.g. Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991; Vanhaverbeke & 
Noorderhaven, 2001). More recent empirical research has attempted to examine the performance 
implications of membership, i.e., what happens if firms decide to participate in a multiple-firm alliance 
and how firms may attain different gains depending on their individual characteristics (e.g. Lavie, 
Lechner, & Singh, 2007; Lazzarini, 2007; Rowley, Baum, Shipilov, Greve, & Rao, 2004).   
Competing groups of firms pursuing joint action are also referred to as constellations, although 
scholars have used this term in different ways. Some have characterized constellations as alliance 
networks (Gomes-Casseres, 1994, 1996), while others have characterized constellations as multilateral 
alliances (Das & Teng, 2002). A possible way to reconcile those different views is to consider alliance 
networks as constellations that are implicitly or informally organized, and multilateral alliances as 
constellations that are explicitly or formally organized (Lazzarini, 2007). In this sense, I contribute to 
this literature by proposing a theory describing factors that will affect the governance of multiple-firm 
alliances. In particular, I analyze how such groups may evolve from informal alliance networks to 
formal multilateral alliances. I do not intend to discuss the formation of dyadic ties and alliance 
networks mainly because past research has examined this issue in detail (Gimeno, 2005). Instead, I 
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take networks as given and describe factors that might influence the benefits of formalizing interfirm 
linkages in a multilateral alliance: the profile of resources available in the group and the overall 
structure of the alliance network. This theory is detailed next. 
 
Profile of Resources in the Network 
 
At the most fundamental level, the benefits of interfirm cooperation largely depend on the possibility 
to internalize positive externalities emanating from multiple firms. The possibility of capturing those 
externalities increases when members hold complementary resources, i.e., when the use of a resource 
increases when it is jointly used with other resources supplied by partners (Lavie, 2007). This tends to 
occur when firms have specialized roles and hence contribute to the network with diverse resources 
that can be combined with one another (Grandori & Soda, 1995). For instance, an airline carrier can 
capture traffic-driven externalities emanating from other carriers servicing alternative routes. Since 
international regulations prevent a carrier from owning foreign infrastructure, that carrier can 
complement its route network by partnering with firms controlling alternative hubs (and their 
associated routes), thereby pooling traffic coming from different regions.  
The benefits of resource diversity, however, come at a cost. Firms must overcome problems of 
coordination and cooperation that arise when exploiting diverse resources. The existence of 
complementarities implies that resources could be recombined in several ways. Uncoordinated 
decision-making may therefore lock firms into sub-optimal outcomes (Levinthal, 1997). The 
exploitation of resource complementarities also requires firms to co-specialize their assets (Doz & 
Hamel, 1998). Therefore, airline carriers may need to jointly invest in idiosyncratic information 
technology to support their operations, or engage in promotion activities to support their collective 
marketing efforts. Lack of cooperation may result if members act opportunistically, for instance by 
free riding on collective investments (Nault & Tyagi, 2001). Transaction cost logic also suggests that 
firms may be reluctant to co-specialize resources if they fear that certain partners will engage in 
adversarial haggling after investments are consummated (Williamson, 1991).  
I submit that the formalization of an interfirm network in a multilateral alliance may help overcome 
problems of coordination and cooperation in a context of high resource diversity. Consider first the 
effect of formalization on the ability of firms to coordinate their joint efforts. Whereas in alliance 
networks firms fundamentally interact on a pair-wise basis (e.g. two carriers establishing codesharing 
agreements to exploit joint routes), in multilateral alliances such interactions tend to be more 
comprehensive and general. This process is facilitated by the adoption of common, standardized 
exchange procedures in multilateral alliances. Standardization creates compatibility across members’ 
production and marketing systems, thereby expanding the possibility to exploit complementarities 
(Thompson, 1967). Furthermore, the process of creating formal agreements and discussing collective 
strategies in decision-making committees represents an opportunity for extensive communication and 
negotiation, which reduces the likelihood that the group will be trapped into inferior outcomes (Farrell 
& Saloner, 1985). For instance, in the airline industry both the Star Alliance and the Oneworld group 
have established management teams involving executives from member carriers (Baker, 2001). These 
features of multilateral alliances can also promote cooperation. Not only do formal decision-making 
committees improve interfirm communication, but they also represent a mechanism for mutual 
monitoring. In addition, by establishing clauses specifying the role and obligations of members, formal 
agreements can curb partner defection expressed as free riding or opportunistic haggling. As a result, it 
is likely that formalization will increase firms’ confidence in their joint endeavor, thereby increasing 
their willingness to co-specialize assets (Poppo & Zenger, 2002).  
However, all these formal features (comprehensive contracts, common platforms, decision-making 
committees etc.) are costly. Formalization may not result in net benefits unless problems of 
coordination and cooperation are severe. Therefore, the network will more likely be formalized if 
resource diversity is high. In other words:  
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Hypothesis 1. An increase in the diversity of resources available in the alliance network will 
increase the likelihood that firms will formalize their association in a multilateral alliance.  
 
Structure of the Alliance Network 
 
The structure of the alliance network should also influence the likelihood that it will be formalized in 
a multilateral alliance. I examine three features related to network structure: density, extent of ties to 
outside actors, and network centralization. 
Network density. Scholars associated with the so-called social embeddedness perspective have 
forcefully argued that a dense web of bilateral ties among firms — i.e., when they are extensively 
connected with one another — will help mitigate problems of coordination and cooperation involved 
in collective action (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996). By enhancing group cohesion, network density 
tends to facilitate joint action and improve communication, consequently reducing the likelihood of 
coordination failure (Jones, Hesterly, Fladmoe-Lindquist, & Borgatti, 1998). Dense networks also 
promote the emergence of shared norms that enhance cooperation. These arguments could imply, at 
first glance, that the likelihood of network formalization should be monotonically decreasing in the 
density of the group: the informal mechanisms brought by a dense web of ties should substitute them 
for the formal mechanisms (discussed before) associated with multilateral alliances.  
I propose instead a more complex relationship. If an alliance network is sparse, then actors may not 
recognize their potential joint collaboration. Firms may simply form bilateral associations 
independently of what other network partners are doing. Some degree of density may be necessary to 
increase firms’ awareness of possible network partners, which could be co-opted for a newly formed 
multilateral alliance. Furthermore, if one or more firms decide to create a multilateral alliance, they 
can attract other firms to which they are bilaterally tied (Gomes-Casseres, 1994). This will tend to 
economize on search costs and allow partners to create a comprehensive alliance building upon 
existing bilateral arrangements. Thus, a movement from sparse networks to moderately dense 
networks should increase the likelihood of multilateral alliance formation. After density reaches a 
certain point, then the informal governance mechanisms that accompany dense networks should start 
substituting for the formal mechanisms associated with multilateral alliances, hence diminishing the 
need for formalization. Therefore, I propose a curvilinear, inverted-U effect of network density on the 
likelihood that the network will be formalized: 
Hypothesis 2a. Highly dense and highly sparse alliance networks will be less likely to be formalized 
in a multilateral alliance than networks with moderate density.  
Since network density promotes coordination and cooperation, it should also help firms deal with 
high levels of resource diversity. Therefore, extensive, dense ties increase communication and allow 
firms to discuss and exploit diverse possibilities of resource combinations. Moreover, a group of 
airline carriers may be more willing to co-specialize their route infrastructures even in the absence of a 
formal joint agreement if they perceive that most partners have ties to one another. If one firm acts 
opportunistically in this case, it should expect the severance of its ties to other members of the 
network. Therefore, network density should attenuate the effect of resource diversity on the need of 
formalization, which suggests a negative interaction between density and resource diversity. In other 
words: 
Hypothesis 2b. The positive effect of resource diversity on the likelihood of an alliance network’s 
formalization in a multilateral alliance will be lower when the alliance network is highly dense. 
Extent of ties to outside firms. Pursuing joint action with members of an alliance network while 
maintaining extensive ties to outside  actors will likely reduce a firm’s commitment to the group 
(Lavie, 2007). Extensive outside ties denote a promiscuous orientation, whereby firms decide to 
preserve their flexibility to assess alternative partners (Jones et al., 1998). These firms should be 
reluctant to join formal multiple-firm alliances because this could curtail their partnering options. 
Firms with extensive outside ties will also be less focused on any particular group, thereby making it 
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difficult for the group to develop joint strategies. Furthermore, an airline carrier establishing bilateral 
ties to firms belonging to alternative multilateral alliances will be able to partially benefit from the 
traffic generated by those groups without incurring the costs of creating and maintaining them. Thus, 
sparseness in outside connections will likely increase firms’ mutual orientation to the objectives of the 
network as a whole, and guarantee that the value generated within the network is largely internalized 
by its members. As a result, firms will be more willing to invest in the formalization of the network. I 
therefore propose: 
Hypothesis 3. The higher the extent to which firms of an alliance network have ties to other firms 
outside the network, the lower the likelihood that it will be formalized in a multilateral alliance. 
The existence of outside ties will also worsen the problems of coordination and cooperation that 
arise when members try to exploit diverse resources. This effect is symmetrically opposite to the effect 
of network density. In this way, extensive outside ties should make a firm less inclined to discuss and 
develop ways to combine and exploit resources in a particular group. In addition, carriers may become 
reluctant to co-specialize their route networks if they perceive that partners have several exit options. 
Therefore, the presence of extensive outside ties should magnify the effect of resource diversity on the 
need of formalization; diverse resources will require formal structures designed to support 
coordination and cooperation especially when partners need to combine diverse resources. In other 
words: 
Hypothesis 3b. The positive effect of resource diversity on the likelihood of an alliance network’s 
formalization in a multilateral alliance will be higher when network members have extensive ties to 
firms outside the alliance network. 
Network centralization. Even if the network is not highly dense, it may involve a hub or central 
firm that “sets up the network, and takes a pro-active attitude in the care of it” (Jarillo, 1988, p. 32). 
For instance, an airline carrier may develop its own set of direct agreements with other international 
carriers, planning their joint routes and coordinating the activities of the network as a whole. Instead of 
a clique, the alliance network in this case would be characterized as a star, whereby a central firm 
creates alliances with other actors who, in turn, have few ties to one another and to other firms 
(Grandori & Soda, 1995; Vanhaverbeke & Noorderhaven, 2001). A highly centralized  network 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994) occurs when a firm has high centrality (i.e., it is tied to many other 
network members), while other firms have low centrality (i.e., they are sparsely tied to one another). If 
there is a firm that is outstandingly central in a given network, it may act as a triggering entity that 
initiates the creation of a multilateral agreement with its partners (Doz et al., 2000) without relying on 
hierarchical authority (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006). The process of network formalization is likely to be 
facilitated when a central firm leads the process and coordinates the achievement of common 
objectives. In fact, most multilateral alliances in the airline industry were basically initiated by key 
players in the industry: for instance, the Star Alliance has been led by United Airlines and Lufthansa, 
while American Airlines and British Airways had a pivotal role in the creation of Oneworld (Baker, 
2001). These firms have long established bilateral ties to several carriers that have later become 
members of formal groups. This argument leads to the final hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4. The higher the centralization of an alliance network, the higher the likelihood that it 
will be formalized in a multilateral alliance. 
 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
 
Data 
 
The data used in this study include 75 global airlines representing about 80% of the total world 
passenger traffic and 54 distinct countries (Table 1), observed from 1997 to 2001. The data come 
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mostly from the World Air Transport Statistics  compiled by the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA), which provides information on airlines’ operations (traffic, capacities etc.), and 
the Airline Business magazine, which presents annual surveys of bilateral alliances (codesharing, 
marketing agreements etc.) and equity stakes between carriers, as well as the composition of 
multilateral alliances in the industry (Star Alliance, Sky Team, Oneworld etc.).  
 
Assessing Alliance Networks 
 
A first step in the analysis of alliance networks is to define a way to construct a matrix of bilateral 
ties. I adopt a simple criterion by considering that there is a linkage between two firms (coded 1) when 
they have either a bilateral alliance or an ownership relation (i.e., when at least one of the carriers has 
an equity stake in the other carrier). Otherwise, I consider that there is no linkage (coded 0). Such a 
matrix is constructed for every year in the sample. Although membership in multilateral alliances is 
readily observable, alliance networks are more difficult to analyze because their boundaries are 
inherently subjective. An alliance network could involve the set of partners to which a firm is directly 
tied; but it could also include indirect connections such as the set of partners of that firm’s direct 
partners.   
Instead of adopting a particular method to demarcate alliance networks, one could generically 
evaluate  all  possible combinations of firms. This method, however, would be computationally 
daunting. Since the database includes 75 carriers, the number of alternative combinations of, say, 5 
firms would be higher than 17 million. To simplify the analysis, I proceed in an alternative way. Based 
on the yearly matrix of bilateral ties, I generate an algorithm to randomly draw network samples 
involving a pre-specified number of firms. For instance, I randomly pick a group of 5 carriers among 
the 75 carriers in the database. I then compute the density of the network sample, i.e., the total number 
of observed bilateral ties divided by the total number of ties that could possibly be formed between 
those firms (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). It only makes sense to include network samples with some 
degree of bilateral linkage between firms. Therefore, I only keep random samples where network 
density is at least .1, and then calculate the variables of interest for those network samples (explained 
below). Otherwise, I discard the sample and proceed with another random draw of firms. I then repeat 
this procedure a certain number of times for each year for networks with different sample sizes.  
Obviously, it is necessary to define how many network samples will be extracted from the data in 
each year, and the size of each sample (number of firms). Since the primary objective is to explain the 
formation of multilateral alliances, it is natural to look for sample sizes that correspond to the size of 
those observed alliances. In this sense, for each year I assess the number of carriers belonging to 
multilateral alliances of different sizes. For instance, in early 2000 there were 16 carriers belonging to 
two 8-firm multilateral alliances (Oneworld and Qualiflyer); 3 carriers belonging to one 3-firm 
alliance (SkyTeam); and 12 carriers belonging to one 12-firm alliance (Star). Thus, 9.7% of the firms 
associated with some multilateral alliance in 2000 were part of a 3-firm alliance; 51.6% were involved 
in an 8-firm alliance; and 38.7% were involved in a 12-firm alliance. Defining a target of 2,000 
network samples for the year 2000, I then generate random samples with numbers of firms equal to the 
sizes of the observed multilateral alliances in a given year, based on the above proportions. Thus, I 
randomly draw 2,000×0.097 = 194 networks with 3 firms, 2,000×0.516 = 1032 networks with 8 
firms, and 2,000×0.387 = 714 networks with 12 firms. When dealing with the previous years, I adopt 
the same procedure, but adjust the target number of samples according to yearly changes in the 
participation of firms in multilateral alliances.  
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Each observation (unit of the analysis) in the constructed database corresponds to a network sample 
Ck with size sk, i.e., it is a random sample of sk firms with network density of at least 0.1. The goal is to 
observe whether those randomly sampled firms belong to the same multilateral alliance or not in a 
given year, and then examine factors that might explain their formal association. In this sense, for each 
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network sample Ck, I compute the following metric, referred to as Multilateralk, which is used as 
dependent variable: 
) 1 ( −
=
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∈∈
k k
C iC j
ij
k s s
m
al Multilater
kk , 
where mij is equal to 1 if firms i and j ∈ Ck are observed in the same multilateral alliance in a given 
year, and 0 otherwise. This variable attains a maximum value of 1 if all randomly sampled firms are 
observed in the same multilateral alliance, and a minimum value of 0 if firms are observed in different 
multilateral alliances or in no alliance whatsoever. To avoid spurious causal inferences, the dependent 
variable is observed at year t + 1 and the independent variables, described below, are observed at year 
t. Consequently, all independent variables are lagged by construction. Thus, I use data on alliance 
networks from 1997 to 2000, which are then used to explain membership in multilateral alliances 
observed from 1998 to 2001.  
 
Explanatory Variables 
 
Resource diversity. I create two variables measuring the resource diversity of each network sample. 
The first measure, named Hub diversity, is based on the idea that carriers positioned in distant cities 
or hubs will be more able to exploit new route combinations to customers than carriers positioned in 
proximate hubs (see Lazzarini, 2007). Such proximate hubs are more likely to be substitutes than 
complements. In other words, the average distance between the hubs controlled by carriers will be 
indicative of the extent to which they are providing the alliance network with diverse resources (e.g., 
local infrastructure). Therefore, for each network sample Ck with size sk, I compute the variable Hub 
diversityk as follows: 
Hub diversityk = 
) 1 ( −
∑∑
∈∈
k k
C iC j
ij
s s
d
kk  
where dij is the distance (in thousands of kilometers) between the main hubs of firms i and j ∈ Ck. The 
main hub of a carrier is defined as the city which, for that particular carrier, shows the largest number 
of departing connections as evidenced by the Traffic by Flight Stage database, compiled by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). In cases where carriers have more than one hub, as 
well as secondary hubs, the choice of any particular domestic hub should not drastically affect the final 
metric because the alliances studied here are mostly international. Thus, the hubs of carriers from 
different countries are much more distant from each other than are the domestic hubs of any single 
carrier in the database.    
The second measure of diversity concerns the heterogeneity of carriers in terms of seat capacity. 
Small firms may specialize in local or domestic routes, while large firms may specialize in long 
international connections. To exploit new routes, carriers will have to co-specialize their local 
infrastructure and competencies in distinct market arenas. Thus, for each network sample k with size 
sk, I compute the variable Capacity diversityk, which is the standard deviation of the sk firms’ seat 
capacity, in billions of ASKs (available seat kilometers, a widely used measure of capacity in the 
industry).  
Network density. As explained above, the density of a network sample network k, denoted as 
Densityk, is simply the observed number of existing bilateral ties relative to the total possible number 
of ties between the randomly sampled carriers (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).  
Extent of ties to outside firms. For each network sample Ck with size sk, I construct the variable 
Outside ties as follows: 
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Outside tiesk = 
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where bij is equal to 1 if there is a bilateral tie between firms i ∈ Ck and j ∉ Ck, and 0 otherwise. N is 
the total number of firms in the grand network; since I am considering 75 carriers in total, N = 75. 
Intuitively, while Densityk  is a measure of within-group density, Outside tiesk  is a measure of 
between-group density (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). It is equal to 0 if no member of the alliance 
network has ties with non-members, and equal to 1 if all members have ties to all non-members.  
Network centralization. The centralization of a network sample Ck with size sk can be measured as 
follows (Wasserman & Faust, 1994): 
Centralizationk =  ) 2 )( 1 (
) ( max
− −
− ∑
∈
k k
C i
i
s s
B B
k
, 
where Bi is the total number of bilateral ties between firm i ∈ Ck and other members of the network 
sample (i.e., it corresponds to i’s degree centrality), and BBmax is the maximum degree centrality 
observed within the network. This variable assumes the maximum value of 1 when the alliance 
network is a star (i.e., when a firm is bilaterally tied to all other network members, which in turn are 
not tied to one another), and the minimum value of 0 when the network is either totally dense (all 
firms are tied to one another) or a circle (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).  
 
Control Variables 
 
Multimarket contact. Contact in multiple markets occurs when two or more carriers serve similar 
routes. In this study, controlling for multimarket contact is important for two reasons. First, as shown 
by Gimeno and Woo (1996), multimarket contact may be correlated with resource similarity. Since 
multimarket contact facilitates tacit collusion and hence attenuates the competitive pressure within a 
network, failure to control for multimarket contact may bias the analysis of the impact of a network’s 
resource profile on the likelihood that the network will be formalized. Second, as proposed by 
Sakakibara (2002) in the context of R&D alliances, “contact with other firms in product markets 
constitutes a network through which the firm can obtain superior information on future consortia” (p. 
1937). Therefore, similarly to network density, multimarket contact may be a way in which firms 
become aware of their strategic interdependence, thus possibly influencing their willingness to form a 
multilateral alliance. Studies of multimarket contact in the airline industry have considered city-pair 
routes as the relevant markets or points of contact (Gimeno & Woo, 1996). Thus, using the Traffic by 
Flight Stage database, I compute the variable rij representing the number of international city-pair 
routes jointly serviced by two carriers i and j belonging to a network sample Ck in a given year. The 
final measure, denoted as Multimarket contactk, measures the average number of route contacts 
between two firms belonging to the network sample.  
Average traffic. This variable is included to control for differences in traffic among the network 
samples. Average traffic is the sum of sampled carriers’ total traffic (in billions of revenues passenger 
kilometers or RPKs, a measure of traffic in the industry), divided by the total number of firms in each 
network sample.   
Cargo diversity. Since most multilateral alliances are devised to exploit passenger traffic, carriers’ 
orientation toward cargo activities might influence their desire to jointly formalize their network. For 
this reason, I add the control variable Cargo diversity, which is the standard deviation of the ratio of 
cargo activity (measured in billion revenue tonne kilometers or RTKs) to the number of employees (in 
thousands), computed for each carrier in the network sample.   
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Average Routes. This variable is intended to check for differences in the amount of international 
routes serviced by the sampled carriers. It corresponds to the average number of international routes 
(in thousands of routes, according to the Traffic by Flight Stage database) offered by carriers 
belonging to each network sample.   
Sample size. Since network samples have varying numbers of firms, it is important to monitor these 
differences. Thus, I create a set of dummy variables, denoted as Sample size, representing the number 
of firms involved in each network sample, according to the size categories given in Table 4. 
Year controls. Finally, I create a set of dummy variables representing each year in the observation 
window, denoted as Year(t), in order to control for temporal effects such as variations in economic 
and regulatory conditions over time, as well as trends in the pattern of multilateral alliance formation. 
 
Method 
 
The decision to form a multilateral alliance is likely to involve a two-stage process. A group of firms 
should first decide whether to join any  multilateral alliance, and then which  alliance to join. A 
network of firms will consider formalizing their association in a multilateral alliance if and only if 
individual firms become interested in joining some formal group. Thus, to test the hypotheses 
presented before, it makes sense to restrict the analysis to network samples with a reasonable number 
of firms participating in some (though not necessarily the same) multilateral alliance. In other words, I 
analyze the likelihood that the sampled firms will become part of the same alliance as most of the 
firms have decided to join some multilateral alliance.   
Within this perspective, I employ the standard two-stage Heckman model (Heckman, 1979). In the 
first stage, taking all network samples, I run a Probit model where the dependent variable, 
Participation, is equal to 1 if at least 42.2% of the firms in the network sample participate in some 
multilateral alliance, and 0 otherwise. This cutoff value (42.2%) corresponds to the average proportion 
of firms in each network sample that are observed in some multilateral alliance, considering all 
network samples, and is used to dichotomize the dependent variable in the Probit regression. As 
independent variables, I use all explanatory and control variables described before plus three 
instrumental variables: the total number of carriers that were observed in some multilateral alliance in 
the previous year, which captures an institutionalization process whereby carriers’ willingness to join 
any multilateral alliance will be reinforced by the number of firms that have already adhered to those 
alliances (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Hannan & Freeman, 1989); a measure of the carrier’s international 
orientation, corresponding to the sum of sampled carriers’ total traffic coming from international 
routes (in RPKs), divided by the total number of firms in each network sample; and a measure of the 
average size (capacity, in ASKs) of the firms within each network sample. Because multilateral 
alliances are essentially global arrangements, one should expect that carriers more involved with 
international operations and with larger operational scale are more likely to participate in those formal 
groups.  
In the second stage, taking the subset of network samples where Participation = 1, I run OLS 
regressions of Multilateral (the dependent variable) on the explanatory and control variables, plus the 
inverse Mills ratio resulting from the first-stage Probit regression. The inverse Mills ratio should 
control for potential biases that might occur given that I am considering only a subset of network 
samples in the final analysis.  
The estimation method employs the Huber-White estimator to compute standard errors. The 
procedure generates robust estimates that control for potential heteroscedasticity in the data. I note that 
although the Heckman procedure employed here requires normality of the error terms associated with 
the outcome variable, in my case this variable (i.e., Multilateral) has clear upper and lower bounds 
(from 0 to 1). Alternatively, I could have employed the so-called Tobit model, which explicitly 
accommodates such bounds. To check the robustness of my results, I ran Tobit regressions and 
observed that the inference about the variables was similar to the Heckman procedure (results not 
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reported here, but available upon request). Therefore, I opted to use the Heckman model to test my 
hypotheses - which, as I discuss next, is justified given that self-selection is apparently flagrant in my 
context.  
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
Table 2 presents the results of two-stage Heckman regressions. I only report results from second-
stage OLS regressions, whose estimates are used to test the hypotheses presented above (results from 
the first-stage probit estimation stage are available upon request). One can observe that the inverse 
Mills ratio is highly significant across all model specifications reported in Table 2 (p < .01), which 
indicates that selectivity bias is relevant in my context and hence the use of the Heckman model is 
warranted. 
Model 1 in Table 2 presents baseline results including control variables only. The significant effect 
of  Multimarket contact  (p < .01) is particularly interesting. Confirming Sakakibara’s (2002) 
conjecture, firms in an alliance network that encounter more frequently in multiple markets are more 
likely to formalize their association in a multilateral alliance. Possibly, contacts in multiple markets 
(routes) increase carriers’ awareness of their strategic interdependence, which might influence their 
propensity to form a broad alliance. This effect is robust across all model specifications. The other 
control variables do not show consistent effects, except Average routes in models 2 and 3: an increase 
in the average number of international routes offered by firms in each network sample increases their 
willingness to engage in the same multilateral alliance (p < .01 for models 2 and 3). 
Model 2 adds explanatory variables related to the resource profile and structure of the network 
samples. These explanatory variables, in conjunction, significantly improve the fit of the regression (F 
= 19.70, p < .01). Results provide support for Hypothesis 1: the variables measuring resource diversity 
in the network samples, Hub and Capacity diversity, significantly increase the extent of firms’ 
participation in the same multilateral alliance (p < .01 and p < .05 respectively). Thus, alliance 
networks whose firms have hubs distant from one another and heterogeneous capacities are more 
likely to be formalized. This is consistent with the idea that the organization of networks as 
multilateral alliances (instead of informal webs of bilateral associations) is a possible way to overcome 
problems of coordination and cooperation that arise when actors seek to exploit complementary 
resources.  
The same model allows for a test of the hypotheses related to the structure of network samples. Both 
Density  and its square value are highly significant and with the expected signs (p < .01), thus 
confirming a curvilinear, inverted-U relationship between the density of network samples and the 
likelihood of their formalization (Hypothesis 2a). Based on the estimated coefficients, membership in 
the same multilateral alliance is most likely when density is around .203. Apparently, while highly 
sparse networks reduce actors’ awareness of their potential joint collaboration, highly dense or 
embedded networks substitute for the need for formal structures to accompany multilateral 
agreements. The insignificance of variable Outside ties, however, refutes Hypothesis 3a: the extent of 
ties between members of each network sample and outside firms does not account for membership in 
the same multilateral alliance. Finally, support is found for Hypothesis 4: Centralization shows a 
significantly positive coefficient (p < .01). Therefore, other things being equal, alliance networks 
involving one or few central firms are more likely formalized, which is aligned with the conjecture 
that the formation of multilateral alliances tends to be triggered by leading actors directly connected to 
other network members.     
Model 3 adds interactions between resource profile and network structure, which are used to test 
Hypotheses 2b and 3b. These interactions, in conjunction, significantly improve the fit of the 
regression (F = 2.97, p < .05), and do not qualitatively change the above results. However, only the 
interactions involving Hub diversity as a measure of resource profile are significant. Confirming 
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Hypotheses 2b and 3b respectively, an increase in network density attenuates the positive effect of hub 
diversity on the likelihood of network formalization (p < .01), while an increase in the extent of 
outside ties magnifies that effect (p < .05). Apparently, the social embeddedness brought about by 
network density helps firms solve the problems of coordination that emerge in a context of diverse 
resources, and make them more willing to co-specialize those resources even in the absence of formal, 
general agreements. Interestingly, although Outside ties shows no significant main effect, it interacts 
positively with Hub diversity. A possible explanation is that the adverse effect of having extensive 
outside ties is only relevant when potential problems of cooperation and coordination are acute (i.e., 
when resource diversity is high). In these conditions, a network with several outside ties may be 
associated with low interfirm interaction and commitment, thus requiring formal mechanisms of 
communication and control. When cooperation and coordination failure are not likely, outside ties 
should not severely affect group performance.  
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
This study contributes to the literature on interfirm networks by moving beyond the focus on dyadic 
alliances and examining conditions in which alliance networks (informal webs of bilateral 
entanglements between firms) may or may not evolve into multilateral alliances (broad, formal 
multiple-firm arrangements). To the best of my knowledge, this issue was not properly explored by 
previous studies; existing work tends to focus on the organization of bilateral deals instead of the way 
in which alliance networks are governed as a whole. I offer a theory to explain the formation of 
multilateral alliances based on both the resource profile and the structure of interfirm networks, and 
provide an initial test of that theory in the context of the global airline industry. In this sense, I 
contribute to the evolving literature on competing multiple-partner alliances (e.g. Lavie et al., 2007; 
Lazzarini, 2007; Rowley et al., 2004) by focusing on factors that should influence the organization of 
such groups. The study also informs managers about how govern their portfolio of alliances—in 
particular, defining the characteristics of alliance networks that should invite formalization through 
broader, multilateral deals. In a nutshell, the data confirm that alliance networks most likely to be 
formalized as multilateral alliances exhibit the following characteristics: high resource diversity, 
moderate density, and high centralization.   
The study, however, has important limitations, which open up avenues for future research. First, the 
airline industry presents many particularities that prevent the results from being generalized for other 
contexts. Therefore, the international traffic in the industry is heavily regulated, which certainly 
influences the formation of alliances because firms are generally not free to enter foreign countries 
through acquisitions. Nonetheless, I believe that this study can serve as a potential guide for future 
research in other industries. For instance, in the computer and microprocessor industry, firms have not 
only established networks of bilateral alliances for technology development and licensing, but also 
formal, multilateral R&D consortia (Vanhaverbeke & Noorderhaven, 2001). In addition, in the 
financial industry, firms have moved beyond bilateral deals to structure formal, multilateral exchange 
organizations (Domowitz, 1995). It would be interesting to examine whether the theory proposed 
here—which is general in its essence—holds up in these different industry settings. 
Second, the results may be time-specific. Therefore, given that my data cover the period from 2007 
to 2001, carriers in my sample were not affected by the September 11
th attacks, which greatly affected 
traffic growth in the airline industry and, arguably, may have influenced their decisions to form and 
maintain alliances. Although traffic growth resumed in 2004-2005 and airline carriers continued to 
engage in multilateral alliances, future research could expand the temporal window of the database and 
see whether the same results hold after 2001. In other words, it will be important to check the temporal 
generalizability of my results.  
A third limitation of this study is that alliance networks are not readily observable entities. One 
could consider a firm’s alliance network as the set of its direct partners; but one could also include in 
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that network the set of partners of that firm’s direct partners. An alternative way to examine these 
groups, which is not immune to criticism, is to define criteria to demarcate alliance networks, for 
example, through cluster analysis (Lazzarini, 2007; Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991; Vanhaverbeke & 
Noorderhaven, 2001). Further research into alternative methods to retrieve alliance networks based on 
the pattern of bilateral partnering between firms is particularly welcome. 
Finally, this study essentially takes the structure of alliance networks as exogenous. This is a 
simplifying assumption to facilitate the generation and test of initial hypotheses on the formation of 
multilateral alliances based on existing interfirm networks. However, the emergence of multilateral 
alliances has implications for the formation or dissolution of bilateral associations between firms, 
which could in turn change the structure of alliance networks. An analysis of this sort would require 
complex, multi-level theories and data with longer temporal horizons. This massive, yet crucial, effort 
of theory building and data collection is left for future work. 
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Figure 1: Hypothesized Relationships 
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Table 1: Airline carriers included in the sample 
 
Carrier name (abbreviation)  Traffic*  Country  Carrier name (abbreviation)  Traffic*  Country 
Aer Lingus (LIN)  8.889  Ireland  Japan Air System (JAS)  15.472  Japan 
Aeroflot (AFL)  16.557  Russia  Japan Airlines (JA)  88.999  Japan 
Aerolineas Argentinas (ARG)  11.111  Argentina  KLM Royal Dutch Airl. (KLM)  60.331  Netherlands 
Aeromexico (AMX)  14.390  Mexico  Korean Air (KOR)  40.467  South Korea 
Air Algerie (ALG)  3.051  Algeria  LanChile (LCH)  9.931  Chile 
Air Canada (AC)  44.806  Canada  Lauda Air (LAU)  4.562  Austria 
Air China (CHI)  18.116  China  Lloyd Aero Boliviano (LAB)  1.701  Bolivia 
Air France (AFR)  91.801  France  LOT Polish Airlines (LOT)  4.757  Poland 
Air-India  (IND)  12.006 India  Lufthansa  (LFH)  94.170 Germany 
Air Liberte (LIB)  4.707  France  Malaysia Airlines (MA)  37.947  Malaysia 
Air New Zealand (ANZ)  22.232  New Zealand  Malev Hungarian Airlines (MAL)  3.168  Hungary 
Alaska Airlines (ALA)  19.273  United States  Mexicana de Aviacion (MEX)  13.498  Mexico 
Alitalia (ALI)  40.618  Italy  Northwest Airlines (NW)  127.324  United States 
All Nippon Airways (ANA)  58.042  Japan Olympic  Airways  (OLY) 8.860  Greece 
America West Airlines (AW)  30.742  United States  Qantas Airways (QUA)  63.495  Australia 
American Airlines (AA)  187.542  United States  Royal Air Maroc (RAM)  7.185  Morocco 
Ansett Australia (ANS)  17.110  Australia  Royal Jordanian Airlines (RAJ)  4.207  Jordan 
AOM French Airlines (AOM)  9.248  France  Sabena (SAB)  19.379  Belgium 
Austrian Airlines (AUS)  8.799  Austria  Scandinavian Airlines (SAS)  22.647  Sweden 
Balkan Bulgarian (BAL)  0.808  Bulgaria  Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAU)  20.229 Saudi  Arabia 
British Airways (BA)  118.890  United Kingdom  Singapore Airlines (SIN)  70.795  Singapore 
British Midland (BMI)  3.837  United Kingdom  South African Airways (SAA)  19.321  South Africa 
Canadian Airlines Intern. (CAI)  23.395  Canada  Sri Lankan Airlines (SLA)  6.860  Sri Lanka 
Cathay Pacific (CP)  47.097  Hong Kong  Swissair (SWR)  34.246  Switzerland 
Continental Airlines (CO)  96.949  United States  Syrian Arab Airlines (SYR)  1.422  Syria 
Croatia Airlines (CRO)  0.644  Croatia  TAP Air Portugal (TAP)  10.385  Portugal 
Crossair  (CRS)  2.073 Switzerland  TAROM  (TAR)  2.075 Romania 
CSA Czech Airlines (CSA)  3.294  Czech Republic  Thai Airways International (TAI)  42.236  Thailand 
Cyprus Airways (CYP)  2.785  Cyprus  Trans World Airlines (TWA)  43.798  United States 
Delta Air Lines (DL)  173.411  United States  Tunisair (TUN)  2.694  Tunisia 
Egyptair (EGY)  9.086  Egypt  Turkish Airlines THY (THY)  16.492  Turkey 
El Al (EL)  14.125  Israel  Ukraine Intern. Airlines (UKR)  0.401  Ukraine 
Emirates (EMI)  19.413  Un. Arab Emirates  United Airlines (UA)  204.187  United States 
Finnair (FIN)  7.460  Finland  US Airways (USAir) (USA)  75.380  United States 
GB Airways (GB)  1.971  United Kingdom  Varig (VRG)  26.286  Brazil 
Gulf Air (GUL)  12.739  Bahrain  VASP Brazilian Airlines (VSP)  4.918  Brazil 
Iberia Airlines (IBR)  40.015  Spain  Virgin Atlantic Airways (VIR)  29.471  United Kingdom 
Iran Air (IRA)  6.229  Iran       
* Passenger traffic in 2000, in billions of RPKs (revenue passenger kilometers), from IATA’s World Air Transport Statistics. 
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Table 2: Factors Influencing the Extent to Which Firms in Network Samples are Observed in 
the Same Multilateral Alliance: Two-stage Heckman estimates
a 
 
  Model 1 Model 2   Model 3 
Resource profile      
  Hub diversity  0.008 
(0.001)
** 0.008 
(0.001) 
** 
  Capacity diversity
  0.001 
(0.000)
* 0.001 
(0.000) 
* 
Network structure      
  Density  0.290 
(0.039)
** 0.289 
(0.039) 
** 
  Density
2 -0.714 
(0.181)
** -0.845 
(0.189) 
** 
  Centralization   0.044 
(0.015)
** 0.044 
(0.015) 
** 
  Outside ties   -0.099 
(0.125)
 -0.111 
(0.124) 
 
Interactions       
  Density×Hub diversity     -0.043 
(0.013) 
** 
  Density×Capacity diversity     0.002 
(0.002) 
 
  Outside×Hub diversity     0.085 
(0.047) 
* 
  Outside×Capacity diversity     0.003 
(0.009) 
 
Controls
b      
  Multimarket contact  0.004 
(0.001)
** 0.005 
(0.001)
** 0.005 
(0.001) 
** 
  Average traffic  0.001 
(0.000)
** 0.000 
(0.000)
 0.000 
(0.000) 
 
  Cargo diversity  -0.166 
(0.579)
 -0.573 
(0.577)
 -0.541 
(0.574) 
 
  Average routes  0.087 
(0.053)
 0.142 
(0.051)
** 0.144 
(0.051) 
** 
  Intercept  -0.153 
(0.069)
* -0.217 
(0.075)
** -0.208 
(0.074) 
** 
  Inverse Mills ratio  0.287 
(0.075)
** 0.231 
(0.071)
** 0.214 
(0.068) 
** 
F statistic   8.73 **  10.73 **  9.94 ** 
a N = 2,419. Only second-stage OLS regression results are reported here (robust, Huber-White standard 
errors in parenthesis).  
b All models also include dummy variables for each year and network sample size (not reported here). 
** p < .01 * p < .05 † p < .10 
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